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Abstract:
Grading inconsistency results from the application of different standards such that grades provide an
inaccurate, and sometimes misleading, evaluation of student performance. Many attempts to correct for grading
inconsistency have either not accurately corrected for inconsistency or have been too complicated to constitute
politically feasible solutions to the problem. Within this context, Item Response Theory (IRT) is offered as a
solution to grading inconsistency. IRT corrects for inconsistencies in the distributions yielded by the various
grading practices of professors and departments as well as the failure of current practices to accurately account
for differing student quality by course.
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I. Introduction
“For students, the currency of academia is the grade. As the only tangible
benefit that students receive for performing well in their courses, grades
provide the primary mechanism available to faculty for maintaining academic
standards. In a very real sense, professors pay grades to students in return for
mastery of course material, and students barter these grades for jobs or
entrance into professional or graduate school.
“In the early 1960’s, student grades, like the dollar, were taken off the gold
standard. Over the course of the next thirty-five years, inflation led to
significant decreases in the value of both college grades and the dollar….It
[grade inflation] damaged the system by drawing attention away from a much
more serious flaw in the academic monetary system: It masked wild
fluctuations in the exchange rates between academic departments.” (Johnson
2003; 196)
This project will deal with grading inconsistency. Grading inconsistency results from
the application of different standards (whether by professor or department) such that grades
provide an inaccurate, and sometimes misleading, evaluation of student performance. The
problem of grading inconsistency is related to, but not the same as, the more commonly
debated, hot-button issue of grade inflation. Grade inflation is defined as a general upward
trend over the years in grades at colleges and universities nationwide that is frequently
considered as reflective of lowering academic standards. Grade inflation is not synonymous
with grading inconsistency because if professors uniformly raised (or “inflated”) grades, then
consistency in grading practices would be preserved. However, in practice this does not
occur; while some faculty members proceed to give out higher student grades, other faculty
members will adamantly maintain previous grading levels (or even become more stringent in
reaction). And, whether the issue is grade inflation or grading inconsistency—the core
concern is the same; namely, that grades become so unreliable as to be meaningless.
Thus, the debates are intricately related—it would be difficult to discuss grading
inconsistency without simultaneously addressing grade inflation. However, the focus of this
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paper will be on resolving grading inconsistency. If grades were only inflated, they could still
constitute accurate indicators of relative student performance with the application of some
fairly simple adjustments. However, when inconsistency is added to the equation, acquiring
an accurate understanding of a student’s academic performance becomes far more difficult.
Grading inconsistency is not entirely a bad thing. Grades are assigned to serve a
number of functions; they may be used to assess the quality of a student’s performance,
provide students with motivation to complete coursework, and to encourage or discourage
students from taking a particular course. Given this myriad of objectives, it is hardly
surprising that professors often choose to strike a different balance and assign grades on
differing bases. Indeed, a tremendous advantage of grades is the flexibility with which they
provide professors in shaping the atmosphere of individual courses.
Nevertheless, if left unadjusted, such grading inconsistency has negative
consequences. There are three reasons why this problem warrants attention: it affects
students during their time at the college, it affects students when they leave school for the
workforce or graduate school, and it affects the ability of teachers to instruct effectively.
Accordingly, this paper will seek to develop a method whereby student’s grades with
different professors or in different departments can reasonably be compared.
This paper will proceed as follows: Section II reviews previous scholarship which has
demonstrated the existence of grading inconsistency at some schools. Section III discusses
the impact of grading inconsistency and why it is an issue worth remedying. Section IV
examines proposals which have been forwarded to address the issue and explains why each
of them either fails to accurately correct for grading inconsistency or is too complicated
mathematically to constitute a politically feasible policy. Section V explains Item Response
Theory and argues that it constitutes the best approach to address grading inconsistency.
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Section VI provides a simulation using data from Macalester College to demonstrate the
efficacy of one grade adjustment method. Section VII concludes and recommends that
Macalester include an adjusted class rank based upon Item Response Theory.
II. Studies Establishing the Existence of Grading Inconsistency
Within the literature on grading inconsistency, two basic methodologies are
employed to establish its existence—those which are exogenous, relying on external
measures of student ability, and those which are endogenous, relying exclusively upon grades
themselves. The initial investigations of the topic relied upon exogenous measures such as
standardized test scores and high school GPA.
Goldman, Schmidt, Hewitt and Fisher (1974) used three variables (SAT Math score,
SAT Verbal score and high school GPA) to predict the grade point of students taking
courses in different disciplines at the University of California, Riverside, during the 19721973 academic year. From the three predictor variables, Goldman et. al. derive a single
variable, which they refer to as the student’s “ability profile”. Predicted GPA by department
is then plotted against this ability profile (all fitting was done using linear regression). The
resulting plot showed a series of lines separated at times by as much as 0.8 units of projected
GPA (on a 4.0 scale; see Figure 1).
Spanish emerged as the most lenient grading of the departments. The History,
Psychology and Sociology departments also graded more leniently than average. At the other
end of the spectrum, the Economics, Anthropology, Biochemistry, Chemistry and
Mathematics departments were the more severely grading departments.
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Figure 1: Translation of ability profile to projected GPA by department for students at the University of
California, Riverside, during the 1972-1973 academic year

Source: Goldman, Roy D., Schmidt, Donald E., Hewitt, Barbara Newlin, Fisher, Ronald. (1974), “Grading
Practices in Different Major Fields.” American Educational Research Journal, Vol. 11, No. 4 (Autumn), p. 343-357.

While it is possible to observe general trends such as the above, precise statements
on the relative difficulty of grading in different departments are not possible due to the nonparallel nature of the lines translating “ability profile” to projected GPA. The Economics
line, for example, is relatively flat, meaning that either the department does a poor job
distinguishing between students or that prior measured abilities have little effect on
performance in the discipline. On the other extreme, the line for Mathematics is quite steep,
meaning that the department does distinguish well between students and that high ability
6

students (at least as indicated by high school GPA and SAT score) are likely to perform
better.
Subsequently, studies have tended to focus more on endogenous measures of
grading inconsistency. Exogenous measures are subject to severe limitations. High school
GPA is of limited utility because high school students are competing with a much broader
population; students at the same university likely represent a small sliver of that broad high
school population and are therefore likely to have similar GPAs. Thus, although high school
curriculum is more standardized than at the college level, it will fail to sort well between likeability students. Moreover, there is substantial inconsistency in grading between high schools
which makes comparison difficult. SAT, on the other hand, aims at too low a cognitive level
to accurately reflect the ability of top students and has come under heavy scrutiny for
potential racial and gender biases (Young 2003; Leonard and Jiang 1999). Ultimately,
exogenous measures are limited because they are only as meaningful as the measures they
rely upon. Thus, the shortcomings of high school GPA and the SAT as ability measures
represent shortcomings in exogenous measures of ability.
The basis for the endogenous literature on grading inconsistency is work done by
Goldman and Widawki (1976). In their paper, Goldman and Widawski were the first authors
to employ what they term a “with-in subjects technique” to determine the extent of grading
inconsistency. The technique used data from the spring quarter of 1973 at the University of
California, Riverside, to construct pairwise comparisons of grades received by the same
student within different departments. If a student had taken courses in two different
departments, the student’s average grade in each department was determined. The resulting
difference was combined with those of other students, and the unweighted mean of the
group was then taken as the net grading bias between the two departments. The authors
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compensate for the tendency of individual strengths and weaknesses to effect the direction
and magnitude of the resulting differential by aggregating data from a large number of
students spread throughout the college.
Goldman and Widawski’s analysis produced two important findings. The first
finding was that grading inconsistency did, in fact, exist. The second finding was that the
grade differentials between departments were transitive; thus, if Biology is 0.2 tougher than
Chemistry which is 0.3 tougher than Physics, then Biology will be approximately 0.5 tougher
than Physics. This property allowed the authors to construct a “Grading Index” centered at
zero, where more difficult departments had negative coefficients and the more lenient
departments had positive coefficients (see Table 1).
Table 1: Grading Index showing the degree of grading inconsistency at the University of California, Riverside
during the Spring quarter of 1973
Combined Major Fields
Anthropology
Art
Biology
Chemistry
Economics
English
Ethnic Studies
Foreign Language
Geology
History
Mathematics
Philosophy
Physics
Political Science
Psychology
Sociology
Urban Studies

Grading Index
-.09
.22
-.53
-.36
.18
-.10
.38
.06
-.30
.05
-.07
.17
-.23
-.03
.03
.29
.38

Source: Golman, Roy D. and Widawski, Mel H. (1976), “A Within-Subjects Technique for Comparing College
Grading Standards: Implications in the Validity of the Evaluation of College Achivement.” Educational and
Psychological Measurement, Vol. 36, p. 381-390.
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This transitivity is not trivial. It is possible to construct a very simple scenario where
it would not hold, as shown in Table 2. While this type of scenario unfolds in individual
cases, the mean behavior of the student body still balances out such that department
differentials are transitive.
Table 2: Basic scenario where grade transitivity does not hold
Student
Al
Beth
Charlie

Biology 1
A
B

Chemistry 1

Physics 1
B

A
B

A

The methodology employed by Goldman and Widawski has its limitations. To
demonstrate the largest shortcoming, let’s consider a pairwise comparison between the Art
and Mathematics departments. In doing the comparison, the method does not consider
whether the students taking both courses tend to be Mathematics or Art majors. If,
hypothetically, Art majors were far more likely to take Mathematics courses than
Mathematics majors were to take Art courses, and if we assume students perform better
within their major, the Mathematics courses are likely to appear to be more difficult than Art
courses. This concern is particularly relevant given the different skill sets which the two
departments draw upon. This shortcoming would later be remedied by Johnson (2003), who
considered the direction of the comparison and found that grading discrepancies persisted.
Despite its limitations, the study represented an advance because it relied exclusively upon
grade data (instead of on external indicators of student ability such as standardized test
scores and high school GPA).
A series of follow-up studies was done at Dartmouth College during the 1980’s
based upon the method used by Goldman and Widawski (1976). The first study, by A.
Christopher Strenta and Rogers Elliot (1987), used data from the graduating class of 1983.
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Their results confirmed those of Goldman and Widawski: substantial differentials between
departments emerged and these differentials once again proved to be additive. A subsequent
study by the same authors (Elliot and Strenta, 1988) confirmed these findings (see Table 3)
and suggested remedying departmental biases through an additive adjustment. This remedy
will be considered later, when grade adjustment methods are addressed.
Table 3: Department adjustment constants for the Dartmouth class of 1986.
(Note: Positive constants represent more leniently grading departments, while negative
coefficients represent more strictly grading departments).
Department
Anthropology
Art/Visual Studies
Asian Studies
Biology
Chemistry/Biochemistry
Comparative Literature
Drama
Earth Science
Economics
English
Engineering
French & Italian
Geography
German
Government
Greek & Roman Studies
History
Math/Computer Science
Music
Philosophy
Physics
Policy Studies
Psychology
Religion
Russian
Sociology
Spanish

Additive Constant
.00
.06
.12
-.32
-.35
.31
.37
.02
-.44
.05
-.16
.08
-.16
-.07
-.19
.05
-.07
-.37
.29
-.07
-.25
.09
-.16
.03
.02
.25
.20

Source: Elliot and Strenta. Rogers and A. Christopher. 1988. “Effects of Improving the Reliability of the GPA
on Prediction Generally and on Comparative Predictions for Gender and Race Particularly.” Journal of
Educational Measurement, Vol. 25, No. 4. (Winter). p. 333-347.
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The non-parallel nature of the lines found in Goldman et. al. (1974) demonstrates an
important limitation of the studies done by Strenta and Elliot (1987) and Elliot and Strenta
(1988). Their comparison of disciplines assumes that an additive adjustment is sufficient to
remedy the differences in grading practices across departments. However, the work of
Goldman et al. (1974) demonstrates that both a multiplicative and an additive component
would be necessary to translate different grades to a 'common currency' or single uniform
scale reflecting relative student achievement.
In all of these studies a common thread emerges. Courses in economics,
mathematics and the sciences are graded more stringently, courses in the humanities tend to
be graded more leniently, and courses in the social sciences (except for economics) tend to
lie somewhere in the middle. These general trends appear to hold at Macalester as well.
Table 4 shows average grades by department at Macalester over the last five years.
The figures within this table are troubling. An average student in Chemistry, for
example, will likely rank in the tenth percentile of the graduating class1. An average student
in Economics will likely rank in the fifteenth percentile of the graduating class and an
average student in Biology will rank in the twentieth percentile of the graduating class.
While individuals may have differing perceptions of the strength of students in
various departments, I would venture to say that few, if any, would seriously make the claim
that the mathematics, science and economics students at Macalester and other universities
consistently prove to be the poorest students by such a large margin. And, even if there were
no significant difference in grading practices by department, there would still exist
differences in practice by professor. This inconsistency alone is sufficient to justify some
form of adjustment.
1

Data comes from the Macalester College Factbook produced by Institutional Research, which provides
the distribution of graduating grade point averages.
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Table 4: Grade Point Average by department at Macalester, Spring 2002-Spring 2006.
Department
Neuroscience and Cognitive Studies
Education
American Studies
Russian Studies
English
History
Geography
Anthropology
Art
Music
Theatre and Dance
Asian Studies
Japanese Program
Religious Studies
International Studies
Psychology
Environmental Studies
Political Science
Sociology
Women’s & Gender Studies
Hispanic & Latin American Studies
Classics
German Studies
French & Francophone Studies
Mathematics/Computer Science
Physics/Astronomy
Humanities/Media/Cultural Studies
Philosophy
Linguistics Program
Geology
Biology
Economics
Chemistry
All College

Spring
2002
3.72
3.48
3.50
3.40
3.42
3.55
3.57
3.36
3.52
3.49
3.37
3.51
3.34
3.39
3.69
3.55
3.55
3.54
3.49
3.38
3.21
3.36
3.26
3.40
3.56
3.46
3.64
3.15
3.10
3.03
3.19
3.39

Source: Institutional Research, Macalester College.
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Spring
2003
3.71
3.27
3.58
3.48
3.57
3.57
3.57
3.43
3.64
3.58
3.49
3.65
3.23
3.44
3.30
3.41
3.57
3.51
3.59
3.37
3.25
3.33
3.30
3.31
3.32
3.34
3.43
3.56
3.32
3.14
3.13
3.43

Spring
2004
3.72
3.43
3.52
3.39
3.52
3.45
3.63
3.58
3.33
3.74
3.49
3.56
3.38
3.52
3.57
3.59
3.50
3.43
3.40
3.52
3.37
3.28
3.34
3.39
3.60
3.45
3.56
3.18
3.35
3.17
3.06
3.44

Spring
2005
3.80
3.60
3.40
3.42
3.46
3.40
3.48
3.54
3.66
3.58
3.48
3.86
3.41
3.61
3.30
3.47
3.39
3.48
3.48
3.38
3.44
3.48
3.49
3.39
3.28
3.35
3.35
3.47
3.23
3.29
3.28
3.20
3.17
3.41

Spring
2006
3.91
3.72
3.69
3.64
3.63
3.61
3.60
3.59
3.59
3.58
3.57
3.55
3.51
3.51
3.50
3.50
3.48
3.48
3.48
3.48
3.45
3.43
3.43
3.41
3.40
3.40
3.36
3.31
3.29
3.26
3.24
3.17
3.03
3.46

III. The Impact of Grading Inconsistency
As explained in the introduction, grading inconsistency is not entirely a bad thing—it
represents the reality of different professors teaching different course levels and using grades
to achieve different objectives. This section, however, will explore the ways in which, if left
unadjusted, this inconsistency can have negative consequences. First, I will discuss the
impact it has on students at the college—in selection of both major discipline as well as
elective courses. Second, I will discuss the impact that inconsistency has on students when
they enter the workforce as well as its impact on potential employers. Finally, I will discuss
how it impacts faculty by creating pressure to continually assign higher grades.
A. Grading Inconsistency and the Undergraduate Experience
First, let’s examine the impact of grading inconsistency on a student’s undergraduate
experience. Coupled with conversations with professors and peers, grades serve to indicate a
student’s aptitude for particular subject areas. Understandably, students tend to gravitate
toward departments where they receive good grades. Similarly, they will drift away from
departments where they receive poor grades. This is usually a healthy process—interests and
abilities don’t always overlap and students can adjust accordingly. However, this process
becomes complicated when there is a discrepancy in how grades are applied by professors or
departments.
Let’s consider the hypothetical case of a student, Sue, interested in Physics, who
receives a B in an introductory Physics course (while the rest of the class receives a
combination of B’s and C’s). Meanwhile, Sue takes a leniently graded Mathematics course
and is awarded an A- (while the rest of the class receives either an A or A-). After seeing the
grades, Sue decides to study Mathematics. The decision could be based upon a few factors:
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Sue could lack the context to understand that her Physics grade actually represents a superior
performance, Sue could still feel dissatisfied with the Physics grade even after
contextualization, or Sue could be fully satisfied but fear that outside observers would see
the Physics grade as an inferior performance. Regardless of the motivation for the decision
an unfortunate process unfolds, where Sue is driven away from a discipline (Physics) in
which she have greater interest and seemingly greater talent. And, while the process is not
always so simple, it unfolds on a regular basis on campuses around the country.
The point of the example stated above is not to criticize the physics professor for
giving poor grades or the math professor for giving high grades. Nor is the point to criticize
any department for giving higher or lower grades, on average, to students. These processes
unfold naturally within any university environment. The point is that students should be
given the context to understand what grades indicate about their abilities such that they can
make informed decisions about their future accordingly.
Let’s consider a second example. This time our hypothetical student, Dave, is a
senior, pre-Med and needs to fulfill a Fine Arts requirement. For the sake of simplicity, there
happen to be only two available courses which satisfy the requirement: Creative Writing and
Art History. Dave is initially inclined to take the Creative Writing course, as it will likely
provide much-needed improvement to his writing skills. However, after speaking to a few
friends, Dave changes his mind. The Creative Writing professor has a reputation as an
unusually severe grader; Dave, who had wanted to take the course precisely because he needs
to improve his writing skills, is sure that he can’t achieve a grade higher than B- (the average
grade in the course). This poor grade, when factored into Dave’s cumulative GPA, will
negatively affect his chances of admission to medical school. Meanwhile, the professor of art
history has a reputation as a lenient grader, where the average grade is A-. Dave takes Art
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History and receives the desired grade, but there is something distressing in this example.
Dave was forced to make an undesirable choice between maximizing his educational
experience and maximizing his chances of admission to medical school.
This basic process unfolds on a regular basis. Students may not choose courses solely
based upon grading considerations, but grades do play a part in the decision-making process.
As one Macalester student explains: “I did take a lot of classes from Professor X and it
certainly didn’t hurt that I knew he was an easy grader. It functioned as a schedule filler…it
was nice to have classes that you didn’t have to put too much work into.” Thus,
inconsistency is advantageous in that it helps regulate workload (although workload can also
be regulated by careful course selection based upon the assignments listed within the
syllabus).
However, this process is troubling not only because it moves students away from
course choices which would maximize their undergraduate experience, but also because of
the effect of this shift in course enrollment. Severe grading relative to the norm has a twopronged deflationary effect upon course enrollment. Students are deterred from registering
for a course in the first place for fear of receiving a poor grade, while students who take the
course and receive a poor grade may be deterred from taking subsequent courses in a
sequence, with that particular professor, or within the department as a whole. A study by
Valen Johnson (2002) at Duke University during the late 1990’s found an estimated
reduction in student enrollment in Math and Science courses as high as fifty percent.
Unfortunately, little systematic data exists to determine the magnitude of shifts in major
choices or course choices within majors. Nevertheless, the impact on elective courses alone
has significant ramifications for both students and faculty.
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The impact of such a decrease in enrollment on students is progressive. First, it
decreases the number of students able to work in professions requiring a Math or Science
background as well as decreasing the scientific competency of the general population (Neal
2006). In addition, as course enrollments fall, Math and Science departments are able to hire
fewer faculty members. As fewer job opportunities become available at universities, students
may be less inclined to pursue Math and Science (at least at the Ph.D. level). One risk of
such a decrease in Math and Science education is that it could affect national scientific
competitiveness, which is critical because: “In today’s global economy, the ability of the
United States to remain competitive relies increasingly on our ability to develop and
commercialize innovative technologies.” (Jeffrey 2006)

B. Grading Inconsistency and the Post-Graduate Experience
Grading inconsistency also negatively affects both employers and students,
particularly traditionally disadvantaged students, because it undermines the potential of
grades to serve as accurate evaluative tools. While grades are far from perfect measures of
academic performance, they are preferable to the alternatives: test scores and networking.
When all students receive high marks, graduate schools and business recruiters
simply start ignoring the grades. That leads the graduate schools to rely more on
entrance tests. It prompts corporate recruiters to depend on a "good old boy/girl"
network in an effort to unearth the difference between who looks good on paper and
who is actually good.
Put to disadvantage in that system are students who traditionally don't test as well or
lack connections. In many cases, those are the poor and minority students who are
the first in their families to graduate from college. No matter how hard they work,
their A's look ordinary. (USA Today 2002)
As grading inconsistency forces an increased reliance on test scores and connections,
traditionally disadvantaged groups of students will lose the opportunity to demonstrate their
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ability through receiving exemplary grades. Employers, on the other hand, will end up
settling for potentially less qualified employees, since applicants’ college performance is
obscured by grading inconsistency.
C. The Impact of Grading Inconsistency on Professors
In assigning grades, professors are traditionally compelled to reconcile two
competing goals. While lenient grades will serve to attract a greater number of students,
severe grades will encourage those students who do enroll to take the course seriously and
complete coursework in a thorough and timely manner. Some professors navigate this
conflict by only using grades in pursuit of only one of these ends; however, this strategy can
put them at a disadvantage. If they grade leniently to attract students, they are robbed of an
effective motivating tool. Instead of leveraging a student’s grade, these professors are forced
to fall back on more informal motivators: coaxing and empty threats. Professors who grade
with sufficient severity to motivate students, on the other hand, put themselves at a
competitive disadvantage relative to their peers in attracting students. Even if the severely
grading professor offers an attractive syllabus and convenient course times, other professors
still offer the comparative advantage of more lenient grading. This competitive incentive can
produce a “race to the bottom” where coursework expectations continue to fall and grades
continue to rise as professors strive to keep pace with their peers. It should be noted that
everyone is worse off in this case: grades no longer act as an enrollment incentive if all
professors give similarly high grades, nor are they able to function as a motivating tool since
students can now predict that they will receive high grades regardless of performance. The
scenario has the characteristics of a classic collective action problem. No individual
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professor is at fault, and individual decisions to offer better grades are rational. An effective
solution can therefore only come from action by the college as a whole.
Stringent grading also has been shown to negatively affect the course evaluations
received by professors. In a study at Duke University, Valen Johnson (2003) showed that
there was a strong connection between grading practices and the course evaluations received
by professors.
Student responses to the survey were significantly affected by the grades that
the students either expected to receive or already had received. For most
items, the influence that students’ grades had on their responses to the survey
ranged from about one-fourth to one-half the importance of the consensus
rating variable estimated from the responses collected from all students who
took the course. This suggests that although the consensus opinion of
instructional attributes was the most important predictor of students’
responses to an item, grades do, in fact, represent a serious bias to student
evaluations of teaching. (Johnson 2003, 100)
Johnson suggested that the bulk of the change in evaluations stemming from grades could
be explained by “grade attribution theory”, where students associate bad grades with bad
teaching and associate good grades with good teaching (Johnson 2003, 100). Johnson’s study
is hardly the first to examine the connection between grades and course evaluations.
However, it is relatively unique in that it used an experimental instead of an observational
format2: course evaluations were given to students before and after the distribution of final
grades such that the main explanation for changes in perception would have to be related to
the grades received by students.3
The cumulative impact of grading inconsistency on faculty who grade with relative
stringency is that they receive both poor course evaluations and lower course enrollments.

2

The handful of other experimental studies, such as those conducted by Holmes (1972), Vasta and Sarmiento
(1979), and Chacko (1983), produced similar results.
3
For a more complete survey of research examining the connection between grades and course evaluations,
see Chapter 3 of Valen Johnson’s book Grade Inflation (Johnson 2003).
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Thus, these professors are “less likely to receive tenure, salary increases, and promotions”
(Johnson 2003, 9) not because they teach poorly but simply because they approach grading
differently than their colleagues.
IV. Taking Action
Each of these factors taken in isolation—the impact of grading inconsistency on
undergraduate experience, on post-graduate opportunities and the negative impact on
faculty—would warrant action to remedy the issue; the combination of all three makes the
value of taking action even greater.
The most common proposal is that the change should come from the professors
themselves or the departments. This proposal is both untenable and ill-advised. It is
untenable because the process of coordinating grading practices among dozens of professors
or a number of different departments would be a logistical nightmare unless a strict curve
with a set average was required for all courses. It is ill-advised because it interferes with
individual professors, who ought to have basic autonomy in crafting their approach to
teaching.
Any effective strategy to remedy grading inconsistency must be implemented by the
college or university at the institutional level. As the central repository for grade information,
the college possesses the ability to provide sufficient information to contextualize grades
such that performance is measured appropriately. This adjustment does not endorse the use
of grades to measure academic performance. Instead it recognizes that grades are currently
used as measures of academic performance and, given this reality, seeks to minimize the
potentially deceptive effects of grading inconsistency.
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This is not entirely uncharted territory; a few pioneering schools have undertaken
efforts to alter grading practices. In the subsequent sections, schools which have
implemented a particular grading reform are noted and their success in altering grading
behavior is evaluated.
The review will proceed as follows. First, I will examine proposals which target only
grade inflation. Next, I will examine proposals which seek to address both grade inflation
and grading inconsistency. Finally, I will examine proposals only concerned with addressing
grading inconsistency. Within each section there is no precise ordering, although I will
generally try to examine policies in increasing order of sophistication (or complication,
depending on your perspective).
A. Anti-Grade Inflation Policies
i. Inclusion of Class Rank
This past fall (of 2006), the University of Colorado became the latest university to
publicly hash out the grade inflation debate. University President Hank Brown took the lead
in a charge to change the college’s policies to contain grade inflation. He argued that the
college should include either a class ranking or grade percentile (within the student body) on
the transcript so that employers and graduate schools could accurately contextualize a
student’s GPA (Brown 2006a). After a lively debate, where the proposal received largely
positive treatment from the media (most notably from Kurtz 2006), the Board of the college
opted for a compromise: class rank would be disclosed with transcripts, but only at the
request of students (Brown 2006c). The compromise was reached following “spirited protest
from professors who opposed tougher, mandatory remedies to curb grade inflation.”
(Brown 2006c)
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Colorado is only the most recent case where political pressure from faculty has
foreclosed the possibility of more fundamental changes to grading practices. This is not to
say that lively debate from different perspectives is bad, but solutions such as the one
adopted by Colorado have more symbolic value than actual impact. Including class rank on a
student’s transcript upon request is a positive step but a small one. Class rank does allow
outsiders to evaluate the relative performance of a student better than GPA alone. However,
it is unlikely to do much to address grade inflation. Students would have to decide that it is
in their interest to pressure professors to distribute lower grades and professors would have
to respond accordingly—a relatively implausible scenario. More problematically, class rank
does nothing to adjust for grading inconsistency within a graduating class and, thus, can give
an incorrect impression of the relative standing of students within the institution.
ii. Restricting Students Who Graduate With Honors
Some say Harvard students are better these days and deserve higher grades.
But if they are in some measures better, the proper response is to raise our
standards and demand more of our students. Cars are better-made now than
they used to be. So when buying a car, would you be satisfied with one that
was as good as they used to be? (Mansfield 2001)
Nowhere has the debate over grade inflation been more intense or more highly
publicized than at the Ivy League schools. Harvard, in particular, came under scrutiny in
2001 when it was revealed that 91% of students had graduated with some sort of honors
(Healy 2001). While Harvard does not necessarily give substantially higher grades, on
average, than its peer schools, it was unique in that it combined such high GPA’s with lower
GPA thresholds for receiving honors. Peer schools, such as Yale and Princeton, granted
honors to approximately half as many students (Healy 2001).
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The resulting controversy produced two grade-related reforms at Harvard. The first
reform was to abolish Harvard’s idiosyncratic 15-point grading system which weighted the
gap between an A- (14 points) and a B+ (12 points) twice as much as the gap between an A
(15 points) and an A- (Healy 2002). The idea was to encourage more professors to make the
downward adjustment to a B+ (from an A-) as the gap would no longer be as large
(Crenshaw 2002). The second reform was to cap the number of honors degrees while
encouraging professors to give fewer A’s. Under the new policy only 60% of students would
be eligible to receive honors, and professors would be notified if their grading standards
differed unreasonably from those of other professors at the college (Meyer 2005).
These reforms appear to have done little to impact grading practices at Harvard.
Students still receive A’s at approximately the same rate (Boston Globe 2004) and mean
GPA for graduating students has decreased only from 3.42 to 3.41 (Meyer 2005).
iii. Deemphasizing grading
Some colleges have managed to control grade inflation without resorting to any
particular policy remedy, by establishing a culture conducive to more severe grading. The
most notable example is Reed College, a selective liberal arts college in Oregon, where the
mean GPA is a relatively meager 2.90 (Neal 2006). At Reed, grades are largely removed from
the learning process.
Papers and exams are generally returned to students with lengthy comments
but without grades affixed. (Reed 2007)
Additionally, students do not receive their grades at the end of each semester as at most
colleges; instead they only receive their grades upon request.
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While Reed is an exemplar in controlling grade inflation, it also demonstrates the
danger of such a policy.
Colin S. Diver, Reed's president, says graduate schools worried about their
rankings are becoming less willing to take students with lower grades because
they make the graduate schools appear less selective.
''If they admit someone with a 3.0 from Reed who is in the upper half of the
class, that counts against them, even if it is a terrific student,'' Mr. Diver said.
(Arenson 2004)
The argument made by Diver is a refrain among those who oppose efforts to end grade
inflation. While it may be a good idea in theory to adjust for grade inflation, the argument
goes, it can’t be done without hurting the students of that particular university. Given this
concern, efforts which put greater emphasis on grading inconsistency rather than grade
inflation may be more prudent.
B. Policies Addressing Both Grading Inconsistency and Grade Inflation
Not all efforts to address grading practices have been limited to grade inflation
measures. A few daring schools have adopted measures far stronger than those pursued by
Harvard and Colorado.
i. Median Grades
A commonly proposed strategy, which few schools have chosen to pursue, is to
include median grades for each course next to a student’s grade so that an outside observer
can gauge the relative difficulty of each of the student’s courses. One school, Dartmouth,
has included both the median grade for each course as well as the course size on all student
transcripts since 1994. Unfortunately, the proposal has been unsuccessful in controlling
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grade inflation; the average grade point has actually risen at Dartmouth over that span from
3.25 to 3.33 (Gardner 2002).
While the inclusion of additional information could be helpful in contextualizing a
student’s grades, this method has two critical shortcomings as a correction for grading
inconsistency. First, it fails to provide any indication of the strength of other students in a
course. A grade equivalent to the median grade in a course with all top students would be
quite an impressive performance, while receiving the median grade in a course with weaker
students represents a notably lower performance. Certainly it is possible to make some
estimate of average student strength according to course level and content, but this risks
providing a misleading picture of student achievement if the composition of a course is at all
counter-intuitive. Second, the process of trying to contextualize over thirty different grades
is unwieldy. For each course, the evaluator is required to make a somewhat complex and
imprecise approximation of the “true” achievement that a particular grade represents. In
practice, then, the inclusion of median grade and course size is likely to do little to aid those
on the outside in understanding a student’s grades other than to create confusion.
ii. ‘A’ Quotas
In 2004, professors at Princeton voted to impose a quota on the number of A’s
given at the college, setting a loose cap at 35% of all grades (Brown 2006b). The initiative
has been at least somewhat successful, as the percentage of A’s awarded fell from 46% to
41% in the first year after the initiative (Mount 2005). Moreover, while the proposal on face
only targets grade inflation, it will likely impact grading inconsistency as well. Professors are
being pushed to give a more uniform percentage of A’s in a each course, meaning that
professors will be forced to assign grades in a more consistent manner. Additionally, this
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policy decreases grading inconsistency produced by the assignment of large quantities of A’s,
which fail to distinguish between excellent and more average performances.
However, the policy still appears to have its limitations. First, despite trending in the
right direction, the number of A’s awarded at Princeton still exceeded the cap by 6% in
2005, meaning that the cap functions more as a guideline than a regulation; a fact which
could undermine its effect. Second, by not considering the strength of students enrolling in a
particular course, the quota has the potential to penalize students enrolling in difficult
courses with other strong students. The more effectively the cap is enforced, the more it
creates a disincentive for students to take valuable, upper-level courses in departments.
C. Mathematical Corrections for Grading Inconsistency
Finally, there are proposals for more precise mathematical adjustments of grades to
determine a more accurate adjusted GPA or class rank. Such adjustments have rarely made it
past the proposal stage as they usually face substantial opposition. The most notable example
is the Duke case, where the grading reform proposal failed by just a handful of votes, due in
part to the complicated nature of the mathematical adjustment. These proposals do not
purport to address grading practices themselves (i.e. they don’t directly affect grade inflation)
but instead are designed to produce alternate, more accurate, GPAs or class ranks.
i. Linear Adjustment
The most common proposal for mathematically adjusting grades is to linearly adjust
the grade according to the difficulty of the course. The most basic linear adjustment is based
upon research done by Goldman and Widawski (1976) and Strenta and Elliot (1987), where
they found that differences in departmental grading practices were additive (i.e. if Physics
courses are, on average, 0.2 units of GPA harder than Biology courses and Biology courses
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are 0.2 units harder than Math courses, then Physics courses will be 0.4 units harder than
Math courses).
The proposal of Elliot and Strenta (1988), then, was to determine the additive
component for each individual course. The adjusted grade would thus be:
Formula 1: Additive adjustment to grades as per Elliot and Strenta (1988)
Adjusted Grade = Nominal Grade +

The constant (S) in the above formula represents course difficulty—a positive constant
indicates a relatively difficult course, while a negative constant indicates a more leniently
graded course. The additive constant was determined by averaging the pair-wise differentials
between a department and each of the other departments.
Their proposal has two advantages. First, it does provide a somewhat accurate
correction for grade inflation. Students are not penalized for taking courses with more
stringently grading professors; nor are they penalized for taking courses with stronger
students. Second, it is simple. The concept of adjusting grades upward or downward a bit
based upon course difficulty is intuitive and the fitting process requires only an
understanding of basic algebra.
The proposal, however, does have its drawbacks. First, it would penalize top
students for taking more leniently graded courses. If a course had an additive factor of -0.5, a
student could not achieve better than a 3.5 in the course, no matter how well they
performed. Second, the method fails to account for the manner in which grades are
distributed. For example, let’s take two courses with the same nine students and both
courses have a median grade of C. In one course, the grades are distributed such that there
are 3 A’s, 1 B, 1 C, and 4 D’s (the grades are “spread”). In the other course, there is 1 B, 7
C’s and 1 D (the grades are “bunched”). The grade of B would be treated identically by the
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linear adjustment method despite its greatly different meaning. In the first course with
spread grades, a B appears to represent approximately an average performance. Meanwhile,
in the second course with bunched grades, a B represents exemplary performance—superior
to that of the other eight students.
A more sophisticated fitting procedure is proposed by Caulkin, Larkey and Wei
(1996) of Carnegie Mellon University. Their linear adjustment fits a line to student ability (T),
translating ability to a predicted grade for each course:
Formula 2: Linear adjustment to GPA as per Caulkin, Larkey, and Wei (1996)
Predicted Grade =

* +

The fit is done by minimizing the squared error between this predicted grade and the actual
grade that the student received. Because both ability of the student and the course difficulty
parameters are unknown, the authors do the fit iteratively. To begin this iterative process,
one of the parameters must be assumed—the easiest assumption would be to set ability
equal to the student’s raw GPA.
This method represents a notable improvement upon the simple additive procedure
previously used. Most importantly, it corrects for differing distributions of grades. The above
example (which consisted of a course with nine students) showed that the additive method
did not do well in comparing a course with quite spread grades and a course with tightly
packed grades. However, the U coefficient within this new linear adjustment formula
addresses the problem. A small U coefficient deemphasizes student ability in predicting grade
allowing for a tighter packing of grades. A large U coefficient magnifies differences in
underlying student abilities producing a greater spread in the distribution of grades.
Still, the method has its shortcomings. First, it relies on the strong assumption that
professors treat the difference between an A and A- the same as between an A- and B+.
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Undoubtedly, this is true in some cases. However, there are cases where the professor takes
a more idiosyncratic approach to grading. Let’s consider a hypothetical professor who only
assigns A’s in truly exceptional cases (when performance far exceeds that of an A-), but
considers the difference between a B+ and B to be rather trivial. The linear adjustment
method would treat this distinctions as equivalent when, in fact, they are not.
A second, more important, shortcoming is that the method would still penalize top
students for taking courses with weaker students. Let’s take a hypothetical case where a top
Mathematics student, Jane, takes a series of difficult courses with top students in the
department and achieves outstanding grades in all of them, producing a high student ability
parameter. Jane also has a passion for Art and takes a number of courses in the Art
department, completing an Art minor. Her work in the department is exemplary—she
achieves A’s in all of her Art courses. The students in Jane’s Art courses have substantially
lower ability parameters but still achieve A’s in the same courses she took. In fitting the line,
Jane’s ability parameter will be dragged down to match more closely to those other students
who received A’s in Art courses. Thus, while nothing about her performance in the Art
courses indicated that Jane is a weaker student, her ability parameter (T) falls simply because
she enrolled in the course. This phenomenon is shown in Figure 2.
This concern may be relevant to more than just a few top students; there would be a
disincentive for any above average student to take courses in departments where students
generally tend to have weaker ability profiles. These students, like Jane, would be forced to
make the artificial choice between maximizing their ability parameter (and corresponding
adjusted GPA or class rank) or taking the courses from which they believe they will derive
the greatest educational benefit.
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Figure 2: Linear adjustment graph showing potential penalty to top students taking leniently graded courses.

ii. Real vs. Nominal GPA
A proposal by Felton and Koper (2004) is to calculate what they call a “Real GPA”.
Their proposal focuses on the importance of a student’s standing relative to mean GPA of
students taking the course (referred to as “Class GPA” within the paper). The formula they
use to calculate this Real GPA is quite simple:
Formula 3: Calculation of Real GPA, as per Felton and Koper (2004)
Real GPA =

2*

StudentGrade
ClassGPA

The result is a series of student grades for courses which center around 2. The proposal
would certainly curb inflation in grades—it would be impossible to give grades which, on
average, exceed two points of real GPA for any individual course. Moreover, it would take a
step toward addressing grading inconsistency—all grades would be reduced to a common
scale.
However, this adjustment for grading inconsistency overlooks one crucial factor:
variation in student strength by course. While sometimes this variation is minimal, there are
situations where it can be notable. Consider the case of a senior deciding between an upper-
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level elective and an introductory elective. One is likely to have students with three more
years of schooling and have far greater background in the subject area, while the other is
with younger students who may know little or nothing about the subject area prior to the
course. Yet, Real GPA would only ask how the student ranks relative to other students in
the course and would reward that student for taking the introductory course.
Such a method could, in fact, introduce grading inconsistency where none existed
previously. Let’s say that a professor is teaching two Economics courses: Microeconomics
and Macroeconomics. Throughout the semester, the professor determines that the students
in her Microeconomics course are superior—they turn in higher quality work in a timelier
manner and are far more informed during class discussions. Accordingly, the professor
assigns grades at the end of the semester such that the Microeconomics course has a mean
Class GPA 0.5 higher. In assigning these grades, the professor is conveying information
about the relative quality of students within the course. Yet this information is lost through
calculation of Real GPA.
iii. The Achievement Index
Around ten years ago, a Mathematics professor at Duke, Valen Johnson, developed
what he terms the “Achievement Index”. Following a controversial debate on the
implementation of the index, Johnson’s method was rejected mainly because it was deemed
to be too complicated.
The index begins with basic assumption that professors are able to accurately order
students. After that, no assumption is made about the particular shape of the grade
distributions. Cutoffs for grade levels within each individual course and student ability are
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determined using Bayesian fitting techniques. The mathematics behind this fitting are
omitted to avoid unnecessary confusion.4
The Achievement Index does avoid the aforementioned shortcomings of the other
adjustment techniques. It corrects for inconsistency in grade distributions, and the quality of
students in each course, such that there is not an excessive penalty for taking courses with
weaker students (or an excessive reward for taking courses with stronger students).
Nevertheless, the complicated nature of the technique limits its utility within a university
setting where the comprehensibility is likely a prerequisite for implementation.
iv. Other Potential Adjustment Methods
There are other adjustment methods which have not yet been applied to grade data.
American college hockey ranks teams according to a maximum likelihood process where the
probability of a team with ability x defeating a team with ability y is simply5:
Formula 4: Probability of a victory according to the American college hockey ranking system
Pwin =

x
x+ y

This method could be applied to grades by constructing a series of pair-wise “competitions”
between students in a course. One would treat one student achieving a better grade than
another as having scored a “win” over that student in the course. The biggest drawback to
the method is that it struggles to account for unbeatens within the system (in the academic
case this would be 4.0 students) as their ability parameter would be infinite. There is also the
difficult question of how the system would deal with ties (i.e. when two students receive the
same grade in class).
4

For further discussion of Johnson’s fitting technique, see Johnson (1997) and Johnson (2003).
The adjustment method is termed KRACH after its creator. For more information on the technique, see
the American College Hockey’s website: http://www.uscho.com/rankings/?data=krach.

5
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Another potential avenue for grading adjustment methods would be to consider
multiple academic ability parameters. Berry (2006) models professional football using
separate offense and defense parameters in order to more accurately predict game outcomes.
Similarly, grades could be predicted by separating different types of academic abilities. A
possible division could be Math and Verbal (like the SAT) or the degree to which the course
is paper or exam based. This unexplored avenue could be incorporated within the
aforementioned linear adjustment procedure as well as Item Response Theory, which will be
discussed in the following section.
V. Item Response Theory
A. Background
Item response theory is designed to measure latent traits—abilities which aren’t
measured directly, but only indirectly through the application of tests designed to draw upon
that trait. Item response theory is designed not just to measure these latent traits but also to
test their consistency between items.
A typical item response curve looks like this:
Figure 3: Typical Item Response Curve
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The curve measures the probability that an individual at a given ability level will correctly
respond to a dichotomously scored question (meaning that there is no “partial credit”, an
answer is either right or wrong). Those at low ability levels (points A and B) are unlikely to
answer the question correctly. Those at high ability levels (points D and E) are quite likely to
answer the question correctly. An individual at a middle ability level (point C) has about a
fifty percent chance of answering the question correctly.
Looking at the curve, it appears unlikely that we will learn anything which would
allow us to differentiate abilities A and B or abilities D and E. Instead, the bulk of what we
learn is concentrated in the middle section between points B and D. In item response theory,
the term “information” is used to refer to how much a given item (or test question) tells us
about an individual with a given ability. Figure 4 highlights the ability levels which the
question tells us the most about.
Figure 4: Sample IRT curve showing ability ranges where maximum information is obtained about students

The information function can be represented more precisely as a continuous function over
the same range as the item response curve. An example is shown in Figure 5:
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Figure 5: Sample item response curve shown with the corresponding information curve

Notice that the information function reaches its maximum at the inflection point of the item
response curve. This convenient fact will make it easier to predict subsequent behavior of
the information function.
A good test, of course, will offer information about students at a variety of ability
levels. If all questions targeted those at middle ability levels, then we would know a great deal
about those students but would lack the ability to differentiate the best students from the
above average students and to differentiate the worst students from the below average
students. The following graph displays two item response curves which provide information
on different levels of subjects:
Figure 6: Two item response curves which provide information on students at different ability levels
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Of course, not all item response curves have the same shape. As the graph above indicates,
curves can be centered anywhere along the ability axis, as well as possessing different slopes.
The curve shown in Figure 5, for example, is also far steeper than the curve shown in Figure
6. Steeper curves offer information about individuals within a narrow band of ability but
provide more information about these individuals. Shallower curves offer information about
individuals within a broader ability range but provide less information about them. The
difference in the shape of the information functions can be seen in Figures 7 and 8.
Figure 7: An item response curve with a steeper information function.

Figures 8: An item response curve with a flatter information function.
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One last convenient feature of information curves is that they can be summed between
items. This allows for the use of individual items to target different levels of ability, which
taken together allow the entirety of the test to distinguish between individuals at all levels.

B. Application of IRT to Grades
The application of IRT to grades is not entirely obvious since they are not
dichotomous outcomes. However, whether or not a student successfully reaches a particular
grade threshold can be treated as a dichotomous outcome. John Young, the one scholar who
has applied item response theory to grades (Young 1989; Young 1990), uses A, B, and C as
the grade cutoffs. There is nothing about the procedure which restricts one to consideration
of those particular grade cutoffs—those were simply the cutoffs which Young found to be
most convenient. A sample graph is shown below with students at three different ability
levels.
Figure 9: Sample IRT curves for grades of A, B and C with three sample students shown
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Looking at the first student (Lee), we see that Lee is unlikely to achieve either an A or B
within the course (the curves cross the ability line at a very low probability). However, Lee is
more likely to achieve at least a C (the ability line crosses the item response curve for a grade
of C at a higher probability. Thus, we would predict that Lee would receive a C in the
course. Using similar logic, we would expect Mary to receive a B, and Ned to receive either
an A or B.
The application of IRT to each individual class produces a set of item response
curves which provides information about a range of student abilities. However, not all
courses will have this convenient distribution where the curves are spaced to maximize
information about students. The following graph shows what a set of curves would look like
if a professor refused to give C’s except under exceptional circumstances (by jumping
straight from B to D in assigning grades).
Figure 10: IRT curve for a sample course showing a bunching of the item response curves for the grades of B
and C, indicating a reluctance of the professor to assign the grade of C

The proximity of the B and C curves indicates that an individual student will have
approximately the same probability of receiving a B (or C) or better. In order for there to be
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C’s distributed to students, we must observe a gap between the B and C curves and this only
occurs at a small sliver of ability levels.
The necessity of correcting for grading inconsistency can be seen from the following
graph where two classes are compared (one in blue and one in red), where a B in the blue
class represents a better performance than an A in the red class, and a C in the blue class
represents a better performance than a B in the red class.
Figure 11: Item response curves demonstrating the importance of adjusting for grading inconsistency

C. Mathematics Underlying IRT
Thus far I’ve only spoken about the basic graphical qualities of IRT. Now I’d like to
introduce the underlying mathematics. The basic formula for an IRT curve has three
variables6:
Formula 5: Expression for the basic item response curve
Pcorrect =

1
1+ e

6

(

)

It should be noted that although the item response function is described in this section, the fitting technique
is not. This discussion is omitted to avoid unnecessary distraction. All fitting techniques for IRT use some sort
of maximum likelihood estimation. The best fitting techniques are marginal maximum likelihood estimation
(MMLE) and the EM (ExpectationMaximization) algorithm. For more information on these two approaches,
see Baker (1992).
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T is the parameter which estimates the ability of an individual student. S is known as the
difficulty parameter and is used to determine where the curve is centered.
Figure 12: An item response curve showing the horizontal shift with changes in the value of S.

When T and S are equal the probability that a student will answer the question correctly (or
reach a particular grade threshold) is one-half:
Calculation 1: Showing how D, the difficulty parameter, functions
1
Pcorrect =
and given that
=0
1+ e ( )
1
Pcorrect =
=1
2
1 + e0
The ability level where T is equal to S is also where the inflection point occurs in the item
response curve and, thus, the curve is at its steepest slope. This is the point at which the item
response curve provides the greatest amount of information about the ability of the student.
The U parameter is known as the discrimination parameter. U determines the slope of
the curve—a high value of U will produce a steeper item response curve and a lower value of
U will produce a shallower curve. The following figure shows how this U value affects the
shape of the item response curve:
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Figure 13: Sample item response curves showing change in steepness as the value of U varies

Because the U parameter determines the slope of the item response curve, it correspondingly
determines the shape of the information function. As explained earlier, a shallower curve,
which is produced by a lower U value, will produce a wider, flatter information curve. A
steeper curve, produced by a larger U value, will produce a narrower, steeper information
curve7.
There are a few variations of the previously described two parameter logistic curve8.
The first variation is a one parameter model known as the Rasch model. The Rasch model
holds the discrimination parameter (U) constant and only fits the curve to the difficulty
parameter (S).
The second variation is the three parameter model which adds an additional
“guessing” parameter to the two parameter model. The “guessing” parameter, c, is designed
for multiple choice tests where the probability of getting the correct response asymptotically
approaches c instead of zero. For example, in a multiple choice test with four possible
responses, an individual’s probability of correctly answering should approach 0.25, as shown
7

The formula for the information curve is:

I( ) =

2

8

*

1
1+ e

(

)

* 1

1
1+ e

(

)

It is referred to as a two parameter model because only the > and ? parameters determine the shape of the
curve. The third variable, ability (@), is the independent variable and, thus, is not considered a parameter in
the construction of the model.
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in Figure 12 (unless answer responses successfully trick respondents into choosing wrong
answers with higher frequency).
Figure 14: Sample three parameter IRT curve with a “guessing parameter” equal to 0.25

The inclusion of this third parameter impacts some of the aforementioned convenient
features of the item response curve. First, the inflection point still occurs when ability (T) is
equal to the difficulty parameter (S), but it occurs at a probability of (1-c)/2 instead of at 0.5.
Second, it complicates the calculation of the information function.
Neither model will be used in this paper. The Rasch model’s failure to account for
variations in item discrimination makes it overly simplistic. The three parameter model on
the other hand introduces an unnecessary parameter—with grades there is no equivalent to
guessing, if a student does particularly poor work, or doesn’t even do the work, then they
will fail to achieve all grade levels except F (which doesn’t constitute achieving a grade level
but represents a failure to achieve any passing grade level). The three parameter model also
undermines some of the convenient mathematical properties of the two parameter model,
complicating the calculation of both the item response curve and the information function.
The final variation is that some authors use a normal ogive curve (which has the
same shape as a cumulative normal distribution) instead of a logistic curve (Lord and Novick
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1968). The fitting of the curve is not substantially different—indeed if adjusted by a
multiplicative factor, the normal ogive will produce almost an identical fit to that of a logistic
curve (Baker 1992). The mathematical convenience of a logistic function, however, makes it
preferable for use in fitting grade data.
D. Comparative Advantages of IRT
IRT has a few comparative advantages as a grade adjustment technique. First, and
most importantly, it corrects for irregular distributions of grades (when grades are either
skewed in some way or irregularly clumped). By treating each grade level as a dichotomous
outcome with an independently determined distribution, no problematic assumptions are
made about the relative difference between an A and A-, and a A- and B+. Other adjustment
methods, such as linear adjustment, assume that the distance between grade intervals is
uniform.
Second, IRT never penalizes students for receiving an A in a course. While some
adjustment methods penalize top students for taking easier courses and receiving an A, IRT
ensures that a top grade can only benefit a student—only when they fail to achieve an A can
their ability parameter fall. Thus, while a student will benefit more from receiving an A in a
more severely graded course, there is no disincentive to taking a more leniently graded
course if the student believes that the course would be beneficial educationally. I should note
that this argument relies on the minimax criteria (minimizing the maximum error of all
student ability estimates) for model selection as opposed to the traditional least squares
approach. This is because it is the cases of bias where pressures are created to alter course
selection, such as that shown in Figure 2.
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The study by Caulkin, Larkey, and Wei (1996) found that the linear adjustment
notably outperformed IRT using least squares as the criteria (the R2 of adjusted GPA relative
to exogenous measures of student ability was 0.321 for linear adjustment and 0.264 for IRT).
Besides not being the appropriate criteria for comparing adjustment methods, I believe there
are two shortcomings within their study. First, it used exogenous measures of student
performance, which are subject to the limitations discussed earlier. The low R2 value for each
of the adjustment techniques demonstrates these shortcomings. Second, their
implementation of IRT relied upon the methodology outlined in Young (1989), which uses
grade cutoffs of A, B and C. By only using these cutoffs, valuable information on student
performance is lost. No distinction is made between an A- and a B+ or a B+ and a B. In
practice, this is where professors do the bulk of their sorting among students, as shown in
the following table which shows the distribution of grades received by Macalester students in
all courses.
Table 5: Grade distribution for all students at Macalester, Fall 2001-Fall 2005
Grade
A
AB+
B
BC+
C
CD+
D
DNC
I
SC
GPA

Fall
2001
24%
20
18
14
7
3
3
1
*
1
*
1
2
6
3.34

Fall
2002
28%
21
17
14
5
3
3
1
*
*
*
1
1
6
3.39

Fall
2003
26%
22
17
14
6
3
3
1
*
*
*
1
1
6
3.39

Source: Institutional Research, Macalester College.
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Fall
2004
26%
23
18
14
6
2
2
1
*
*
*
1
2
5
3.40

Fall
2005
28%
25
17
13
5
2
2
1
*
1
*
1
1
5
3.43

Third, IRT produces an information function which can serve as a useful resource
for faculty. If, at the end of each semester, faculty members were provided with a report on
their grading which includes the information function for each of their courses, they would
be able to see which students they are sorting well and which students they are sorting
poorly. A professor could then choose to adjust grading practices accordingly.
Fourth, IRT is potentially more acceptable than other adjustment techniques
involving complicated mathematics, such as the Achievement Index, for two reasons. First,
the item response curve behaves intuitively (the probability of a student answering a
question correctly, or achieving a particular grade level, increases as their ability parameter
increases) and this behavior can be shown graphically. Accordingly, the method can be
explained and (more or less) comprehended without a complete understanding of the
underlying mathematics. Second, IRT is currently used to calibrate standardized tests such as
the SAT. While few people are aware of this, I believe that this use of IRT can be cited as
evidence of the method’s efficacy as well as its acceptance within a portion of the academic
community. Thus, although the Achievement Index shares many of the advantages of IRT, I
believe that IRT is a superior method.
VI. Simulation to Show Efficacy of Grade Adjustment Techniques
Although the previous section provided arguments as to why item response theory is
the best method to adjust for grading inconsistency, this is not to imply that the other
adjustment techniques surveyed earlier in the paper are bad techniques. Indeed, a number of
those techniques are at least moderately effective at adjusting for grade inflation and/or
grading inconsistency. Accordingly, this section of the paper will demonstrate the efficacy of
one of those techniques—linear adjustment. This efficacy will be shown through a
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simulation where grades for entire departments are raised or lowered in order to create
substantial inconsistency9. The question then is to see if linear adjustment is accurately able
to sort out this artificially imposed “noise”. Data for this section is drawn from the
Macalester College Registrar. The data set includes 442 students who graduated as part of
the Class of 2005 at Macalester.
Before delving into the analysis of linear adjustment, a brief review of the method is
in order. The method works by calculating a predicted grade according to a linear fit of a
latent ability parameter.
Predicted Grade =

* +

The method then seeks to minimize the squared error between this predicted grade and the
actual grade received by each of the students within the course. Because both student ability
(T) and the course parameters (U and S) are unknown, this fit must be done iteratively. The
initial value used within this iterative fit is that we assume that student ability is equal to
GPA-based class rank. This, of course, is not a very accurate measurement of student ability
but error in this initial estimation will rapidly be eliminated by the iterative process.
In the simulation, all grades within the Chemistry department were raised by three
points, all grades in the Psychology department were raised by two points, and all grades in
the Math and Biology departments were lowered by three points. This alteration quite
effectively skewed GPA-based student rank such that there appears to be little correlation
between a student’s new GPA-based class rank and the original GPA-based class rank. In
the following scatterplots, student performance is measured by student ranking where 442
represents the highest student ranking and 1 represents the lowest student ranking.
9

This simulation was done jointly with Professor Danny Kaplan at Macalester College. Programming for
the simulation was done using the statistics package, R.
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Figure 15: Scatterplot showing correlation between GPA-based class rank prior to and following
experimental imposition of the inconsistency.

However, application of the linear adjustment method to this grade data greatly
decreases the spread imposed by the addition of this grading inconsistency. The method
appears to have moved points which were skewed substantially one way or another back
toward the line where the unaltered rank is equal to the altered rank (along this line there is
no inconsistency).
Figure 16: Scatterplot showing correlation between adjusted class rank prior to and following experimental
imposition of the inconsistency.

46

This correction is quite impressive given the magnitude of the inconsistency imposed. When
one considers that inconsistency in actual grade data is rarely so extreme, linear adjustment
method is only likely to perform better when applied to such data.
The simulation provides strong support for the use of linear adjustment of grades in
determining class rank. It shows that the method is able to correct for a substantial portion
of grading inconsistency, providing a more accurate understanding of student performance.
Thus, the question is not whether it is possible to correct for grading inconsistency, but
simply what the best method is to do so.
VII. Conclusion
A. Summary
This paper identifies three primary reasons why adjustments for grading
inconsistency are necessary. First, unadjusted grades provide a misleading evaluation of
student performance which can produce artificial pressure on student course selection.
Second, unadjusted grades make outside evaluation of academic performance difficult.
Potential employers are deprived of the information they need to choose the most qualified
candidate, and are left to rely on ‘old boys’ networks to select employees, further
disadvantaging traditionally disadvantaged groups. Third, a lack of grade adjustment
increases pressure on professors to assign high grades in exchange for positive course
evaluations and higher course enrollments in future semesters. This process can undermine
professorial autonomy in assigning grades, decreasing the ability of grades to serve as an
effective motivational tool.
In response to these shortcomings, a handful of universities around the country have
taken action to address grade inflation and/or grading inconsistency. These efforts have had
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mixed success; most see little or no change in grading practices post-reform. The problem is
that most reforms require changes in the practice of assigning grades itself. This is a weaker
approach because it both fails to account for the pressures which professors face in
assigning grades and can limit the freedom of professors to assign grades in order to
optimize their classroom environment.
More mathematical approaches to grading inconsistency, such as calculation of “Real
GPA”, the “Achievement Index”, and linear adjustments, have also been proposed. Real
GPA and linear adjustments suffer from limitations which ensure that they will inaccurately
correct for grading inconsistency, either providing a misleading evaluation of student
performance or creating disincentives to take particular courses based upon the grade
distribution given by that particular professor. On the other extreme, the Achievement Index
has been rejected for its mathematical complexity, which engenders opposition when
implementation at a college or university is proposed.
Within this context item response theory (IRT) is offered as a solution to grading
inconsistency. IRT would not require any change in grading practices; it would simply
provide an adjusted ranking to aid in interpreting grades which have already been assigned.
Moreover, IRT is not subject to the criticisms of bias in adjustment leveled against Real
GPA and linear adjustments. Finally, IRT is a more acceptable mathematical technique. It is
based in broadly accepted test theory, decreasing the odds that it will meet opposition in
implementation due to mathematical complexity.
B. Recommendations
Based upon the preceding analysis, I believe that Macalester would benefit from
using IRT to adjust for grading inconsistency. The change would be relatively minor:
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transcripts would simply carry an additional piece of information, the student’s IRT-based
adjusted class rank. The rest of the transcript would remain unchanged. While the
adjustment process would be simple, the implications would be notable. With academic
performance better contextualized, the disincentive to take more severely graded courses
would be reduced or removed altogether. This adjusted class rank would more accurately
reflect student performance, better informing potential employers. Professors would likely
receive less pressure from students to distribute high grades as relative standing (to other
students) in a course would be more important than absolute standing (the grade itself).
Beyond these improvements in the educational process, Macalester would stand to
benefit from taking a leading role among its cohorts in adjusting for grading inconsistency.
The schools which have taken action to address, primarily, grade inflation (such as the
University of Colorado, Harvard, and Princeton) have received extensive, mostly positive,
publicity. The public perception is that addressing problems with grading is a forwardthinking strategy which shows that the school is both daring and shrewd. Macalester,
however, has the opportunity to advance beyond the basic approaches tried at other schools
and implement a policy which focuses on grading inconsistency, instead of just grade
inflation and avoids the pitfalls of less appropriate grading remedies.
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